Can the EU and India Join Forces to Secure the Indo-Pacific?

The European Union is seeking a bigger security role in the Indo-Pacific at a time when the United States is on the back foot in the Eastern Hemisphere. India, whose economy is rising and whose global ambitions are growing, is looking for new partners and has been drawn into fresh forums, including closer defense ties with the European bloc.

In January, India and the EU signed a Security and Defense Partnership. Their first formal Security and Defense Dialogue followed in March, and further meetings took place through the year, among them the fifth Maritime Security Dialogue in Brussels last month. Both sides want stronger maritime cooperation, yet working together in the Indo-Pacific remains difficult because their defense priorities differ.

Mohan Kumar, a former Indian ambassador to France, told DW that Europe "can be a credible defense partner of India, especially in the maritime theater in general and Indo-Pacific in particular." He cautioned, however, that other crises limit Europe's capacity. The conflict in Ukraine, which is of existential importance to Europe, can detract from this objective, he said.

France is seen as an exception because of its established military presence in the Indian Ocean. Kumar noted that France, through Reunion Island and Mayotte, already cooperates with India in the region and that this could be intensified. Javed Ashraf, another Indian diplomat, called France "a strong, trusted and consistent security partner across the full spectrum of defense cooperation." He added that France has no defense cooperation with Pakistan or China at present.

A Paris-New Delhi relationship does not automatically produce a coherent European role, though. France is the EU's only nuclear power and has its strongest military force, but Tara Kartha, a former member of India's National Security Council Secretariat, said Europe as an entity has very little role in Indo-Pacific security despite announcing a strategy in 2025. She pointed to political differences among member states, which were visible at the EU summit in Brussels on October 15 and 16, where leaders reaffirmed support for Ukraine but signaled disagreements over funding and national priorities.

As a result, much of India's defense cooperation with Europe still runs through individual countries. Germany, Spain, Italy and Poland have all become important partners, and Germany, the EU's largest economy, has joined France in selling major equipment to India. Ashraf said Brussels could signal broader support for these national partnerships and open access to EU-funded programs in areas such as maritime security, space, critical minerals, chips and defense technologies. He also said India is becoming an important source of defense supplies for a re-arming Europe, while Kumar suggested India could gain access to drone technology based on Europe's experience in Ukraine.

Russia and China remain the biggest obstacles. India still depends heavily on Russian equipment and technology even as it tries to diversify, while European governments have been locked in a tense standoff with Russia since its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Gulshan Sachdeva, a professor of European Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, said buying big-ticket items such as Rafale jets from France or submarines from Germany is one thing, but integrating India's defense industry into Europe's expanding value chain is harder while Russia remains Europe's principal security concern.

China poses a different challenge. India sees it as a rival and a source of major security problems, including a continuing border dispute. The EU also describes China as a "systemic rival," but its members differ on how to balance security worries against economic ties with Beijing. That makes a shared assessment of Indo-Pacific threats harder to reach.

The new partnership gives India and the EU a framework for closer engagement, but not a joint security commitment. Ashraf said the two sides could strengthen each other's capabilities but are unlikely to exert visible influence on the global security order. For now, maritime domain awareness, information-sharing, defense technology and selective industrial cooperation look like more realistic goals than a common security role across the Indo-Pacific.